The URL can be used to link to this page

Home My WebLink Abouta. (Handout) Active Shooter Training Presentation (Handout) Training Presentation WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: Awareness, Prevention, Response y�:t Provided for the Central Contra Costa � r _ `--= July 2021 Sanitary District BOD ,:� r and Leadership Team �.� Dr. Steve Albrecht, SHRM PHR, ASIS CPP, ATAP CTM 866-261-5150 www.DrSteveAlbrecht.com THE ��NEW" WORK ENVIRONMENT? Economic ,� � Mental stress .A � illness The Age of Revenge and' Entitled Disgruntlement" ]ob Stress and Hostile Interactions Gun Access and the Culture of Acceptable Violence Personal Problems Come to Work THE ROBERT MACK INCIDENT � � 25-Year General Dynamics � r -- employee. 1 4r Fired for attendance violations. ` January 1992 - Shot and killed ' � � 4K the Labor Relations Mgr. ', assigned to his case; shot and �� wounded hls manager, who later died. pE#ilSiHG1G0i.EifCE THEMES AND MOTIVES: MACK, HANSEL, DEKRAAI DESIRE FOR REVENGE ENTITLEMENT BLAME THE VICTIM / "THE SYSTEM" HAD A PLAN; NO APPARENT LEAKAGE 2 OF 3 "OVER-ARMED" THEMSELVES NO REMORSE; 2 LWOPS - SAD FOR WHERE THEY ARE, NOT WHAT THEY DID TYPES OF THREATS Direct i clear statements of harm ` Veiled indirect, vague, or subtle statements Conditional If-then threats Implausible unrealistic statements HUNTERS vs. HOWLERS Hunters work in stealth. They show evidence of planning and move along a path from"ideas to actions." Their goal is to attack with lethal violence. Howlers show visible anger. They use direct intimidation, verbal and written threats to create fear, stress, and anxiety in their targets. Their goal is control of the victims'emotional states. Hunters do not howl. Howlers do not hunt. When Howlers begin to hunt, they are no longer Howlers. (Source: Calhoun &Weston; Debra M. Jenkins"Intimacy Effect") PERPETRATORS OF WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PER OSHA Type 1 : Criminals or strangers. Type 2: Taxpayers, customers, students, patients, passengers, vendors, etc. Type 3: Current or former employees. Type 4: Current or former spouse/partner of an employee. (Type Cyber-related threats, attack.) ? DEFINING WORKPLACE VIOLENCE As defined by the media: - "a disgruntled ex-employee with an assault rifle..." For our purposes, it's any incident that could: - involve threats or assaults to or from an employee, ex- employee, vendor, stranger, or criminal; - make any employee feel afraid to come to work; - cause damage to facility or personal property; - involve domestic violence or stalking. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM "4 of the biggest mass shootings in 5 aecaaes hannPned in 2018" — USA Today, November 9, 2018 Stoneman Douglas High, Parkland, FL — 17 Grim times: Borderline Bar and Grill — 12 307 mass Tree of Life Synagogue — 11 shootings in Santa Fe High, Santa Fe, TX — 10 311 days Baptist Church, Sutherland Springs, TX — 25 (2017) Las Vegas, NV — 58 (2017) 5 events in 1999; 1 event in 2000; 1 event in 2001; 0 events in 2002; 1 event in 2003; 1 event in 2004; 2 events in 2005. USSS 2017 REPORT: MASS ATTACKS IN PUBLIC SPACES: Mass attack: One or more attackers, using one or more firearms or other weapons, to injure three or more people, in a public setting. 28 incidents, 147 killed, 700 injured. 64% of attackers "experienced mental health symptoms" prior to the attack: psychoses, suicidal thoughts, depression. 46% had "personal grievances" as their main motivation: workplace, domestic, personal. All had one or more of"significant stressors": family problems, failed love relationship, personal issues, work or school problems, financial problems, substance abuse, LE contact. "TARGETED VIOLENCE" As defined by the US Secret Service, "the subject chooses a target in advance. The violence is not random or gang-related. There is evidence of planning. Threats are not made to the target directly, but to a third-party." The impact of these events is substantial, affecting: the community the first-responders the surviving employees or students (who may have guilt) the families of the injured or killed The District and its employees 2018 FBI REPORT: "A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the US, Between 2000-2013" 1. The 63 active shooters examined in this study did not appear to be uniform in any way such that they could be readily identified prior to attacking based on demographics alone. 2. Active shooters take time to plan and prepare for the attack, with 77% of the subjects spending a week or longer planning their attack and 46% spending a week or longer actually preparing (procuring the means) for the attack. 3. A majority of active shooters obtained their firearms legally, with only very small percentages obtaining a firearm illegally. 4. The FBI could only verify that 25% of active shooters in the study had ever been diagnosed with a mental illness. Of those diagnosed, only three had been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder. 5. Active shooters were typically experiencing multiple stressors (an average of 3.6 separate stressors) in the year before they attacked. 2018 FBI REPORT: "A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the US, Between 2000-2013" 6. On average, each active shooter displayed 4 to 5 concerning behaviors over time that were observable to others around the shooter. The most frequently occurring concerning behaviors were related to the active shooter's mental health, problematic interpersonal interactions, and leakage of violent intent. 7. For active shooters under age 18, school peers and teachers were more likely to observe concerning behaviors than family members. For active shooters 18 years old and over, spouses/domestic partners were the most likely to observe concerning behaviors. 8. When concerning behavior was observed by others, the most common response was to communicate directly to the active shooter(83%) or do nothing (54%). In 41% of the cases the concerning behavior was reported to law enforcement. Therefore,just because concerning behavior was recognized does not necessarily mean that it was reported to law enforcement. 2018 FBI REPORT: "A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the US, Between 2000-2013" 9. In those cases where the active shooter's primary grievance could be identified, the most common grievances were related to an adverse interpersonal or employment action against the shooter (49%). 10. In the majority of cases (64%) at least one of the victims was specifically targeted by the active shooter. IS THERE A COPYCAT FACTOR? A study of workplace and school shootings from two psychology professors from Western New Mexico University: "If the mainstream media and social media make a pact to no longer share, reproduce, or retweet the names, faces, detailed histories, or long-winded statements from these killers, we could see a dramatic reduction in mass shootings. People who commit mass shootings in America tend to share three traits: depression, social isolation, and pathological narcissism. We call on the media to deny these shooters the fame they seek." "We know historically there is a strong copycat phenomenon with high-profile mass shootings. When there's one in the news it tends to spur a number of copycat events, so people feel a contagion effect. One leads to another, which leads to another." -- Dr. Jonathan M. Metzl, Vanderbilt University THE TARGETED VIOLENCE PROCESS A key to identification and resolution of threat cases is early identification of "'attack related" behaviors. Perpetrators of targeted acts of violence engage in covert and overt behaviors prior to their attacks: they consider they plan they prepare they share, usually with third-parties they move from ideas to actions Source: USSS Pathway to Workplace Targeted E ied Violence AMOCK 17 Disconnected, disaffected, depressed, driven to act, 18 desire for revenge, desperate, dangerous Early Psychopathy, Narcissistic Entitlement, Depression, No Empathy or Regard for Self or Others "I want to outdo my idols. I want international attention. I want to be infamous. You can only kill me once. My actions will live on." REALITY CHECK These events are both catastrophic and rare, still mostly committed by male Lone Wolf Actors. No shooter has ever impersonated a cop or breached a secured door. We know Run — Hide — Fight works. We can't "predict violence," but we can assess dangerous, threatening, or pre-attack behaviors. We can listen for third-party threats and "leakage." Our greatest strengths: employee and management vigilance; rapid but measured responses; partnerships with our safety and security stakeholders; training, plans, and drills; and a Threat Assessment Team. DR. REID MELOY: ATTACKER CHARACTERISTICS On a path to violence: research, planning, preparation, focus, implementation, suicide or escape plan. Fixation on targets. Identification with a commando / warrior mentality. Energy burst, after social isolation. Testing, rehearsal, boundary probing. Leakage of third-party threats. Last resort thinking: justified, trapped, no other options. Post-incident feelings: anger, contempt, disgust, satisfaction. USSS SCHOOL SHOOTER RISK FACTORS Violent behavior toward others. History/perception of being bullied or victimized by others. History of discipline. Poor student achievement or academic progress. Peers and/or teachers are fearful of student. Sensitivity to feedback/criticism. Student tends to hold on to resentments or harbors a grudge. Reacts to discipline with agitation, violence, and unpredictability. PROTECTIVE FACTORS / DISINHIBITORS Stable family life. No history of child abuse. Appropriate peer support. No access to firearms. In a therapeutic relationship. Stabilized medication use. No street drug/alcohol use. No suicidality/homicidality. More Howler behavior (attention-seeking self-leakage) versus Hunter behavior (planning). Hope for the future, money. WHAT WE KNOW THAT WORKS Vigilance from CCCSD leadership, department heads, managers, supervisors, and staff. Listening for and responding to pre-attack leakage" comments, postings, threats, and behaviors. Using Threat Assessment Team processes. Early and coordinated responses from LE and clinicians. Facility security hardware and communications. Access control, visitor procedures, security improvements. Community notification systems, tip lines. Regular drills with staff and police. Crisis management plans and PTSD debriefing services. THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAMS H R GM's Office Security / Safety Department Heads Law Enforcement Labor Relations Counsel Union Reps Risk Management PIO / Communications Facilities Supervisors IT TM Consultants EAP or Behavioral Health Clinicians (* Keeps all case notes.) TAT MEETING CRITERIA Threats or violence toward leadership, meetings, facilities. Threats or violence to any employee, by a current or former employee; visitor; vendor, stranger. Employee-to-employee bullying, threats, or violence. High-risk employee discipline or terminations. Domestic violence crossovers with employees. Threats to the facilities, including bomb threats. Cyber threats. Vexatious litigants. TAT RESPONSES "proactively identify, assess, and manage threats against our employees and facilities." • Interviews with the subject. • Interviews with reportees, bosses, co-workers, witnesses. • Consulting with stakeholders, based on expertise. • Information collection review and assessment. • Assessing all communications and background data. • Create a Risk Priority. • Create a range of security, HR, or LE interventions. • Manage leave and/or re-entry plans. • Maintain and review case files. TAT DUE DILIGENCE Organizational safety. Employee safety / fear management. Facility safety / access control / law and policy enforcement. Information / gossip / rumor control. Return to work for victim-employees and suspect- employees. Appropriate, responsible, empowering follow-ups. HOW CAN WE SUCCEED AS A TAT? By better understanding the difference between "predicting violence" versus "assessing dangerousness." By understanding the differences between Hunters and Howlers. By being more aware of behaviors of concern. By focusing more on the subject's actions and less on verbal threats. By looking at each case from the POV of the victim(s), the subject, witnesses, the organization. By using Threat Assessment Team processes. By using humane and creative EAP, HR, and police procedures. By being proactive. ASSESSING OUR MISSION STATEMENT Is our goal "'Peace" or "'Justice?" Can we tolerate ambiguous solutions? ("Case Closed" or "'Case Inactive?") Can we see beyond our specialty areas? Can we accept that people do not always want our help or our solutions? Can we accept the fact we may fail? Are we really willing to think outside the box? WHAT IS A THREAT ASSESSMENT? "Threat assessment is an investigative process leading to an opinion about the seriousness of a situation (David Batza, 1990)." Threat Assessment is both a science and an 'intuitive art." Beware of statistics or profiles; we are not "predicting violence." Threat Assessment is just a ""Window in Time." More than just warning signs or threats alone, it's a unique and overall view of changing, relevant, and related behaviors in context. HISTORY OF THREAT ASSESSMENT RESEARCH f Gavin de Becker ( The Gift of Fear) Dr. Fred Calhoun, U.S. Marshals / TSA ("Hunters and Howlers") -*�* Steve Weston, J.D., retired CHP (with Calhoun, ThreatAssessmentandw Management Strategies and Contemporary Threat Management) SSA Bryan Vossekuil, Dr. Robert Fein, Dr. Marisa Reddy, USSS (Exceptional Case Study Project and Safe School Initiative reports) HISTORY OF THREAT r" ASSESSMENT RESEARCH Dr. John Monahan, University of VA School of Law, d (called "the leading thinker on the issue of violence risk assessment") Dr. Park Dietz, Newport Beach, CA ! (stalking behaviors, threat assessments, expert witness testimony) Dr. Reid Meloy, Diego,San CA (predatory versus affective violence, stalking research) 6 p The WAVR-21 (White & Meloy) Absent — Present - Prominent 1. Motives for Violence 2. Homicidal Ideas, Violent Fantasies or Preoccupation 3. Violent Intentions and Expressed Threats 4. Weapons Skill and Access 5. Pre-attack Planning and Preparation 6. Stalking or Menacing Behavior 7. Current Job Problems 8. Extreme Job Attachment 9. Loss, Personal Stressors and Negative Coping 10. Entitlement and Other Negative Traits 33 WAVR-21 continued (White & Meloy) Absent — Present - Prominent 11. Lack of Conscience and Irresponsibility 12. Anger Problems 13. Depression and Suicidality 14. Paranoia and Other Psychotic Symptoms 15. Substance Abuse 16. Isolation 17. History of Violence, Criminality, and Conflict 18. Domestic/Intimate Partner Violence 19. Situational and Organizational Contributors to Violence 20. Stabilizers and Buffers Against Violence 21. Organizational Impact of Real or Perceived Threats NOT PROFILES OR LABELS: Behaviors Troubled or troubling? Angry? Depressed? Suicidal ideations? 'Injustice Collector"? Brittle" personality? Hypersensitive? Substance abuser? Bully or bullied? Significant life problems with no sense of support? (No father, mentor, relative who cares.) Acquired or practiced with a firearm? Makes veiled or provocative comments about workplace/school violence cases? Other people are concerned? Third-party threats, leakage? 'Hunter" or ' Howler"? Moving from ideas to actions? CRITICAL TA QUESTIONS Do we know who it is? (Manage the victim or the suspect?) Is it a cause, demand, or a threat? Can we provide a viable solution? Likes / hates / wants? Troubled or troubling? Hunter or Howler? Movement from ideas to actions? Homicidal or suicidal? Repetition, escalation, or boundary probing? Fitness for Duty evaluation? (� Give up your gun?") CRITICAL TA QUESTIONS Cyber threats or in-person contacts? HR issue, LE issue, EAP, security, or mental health issue? Prescription medication compliance? Civil order compliance? What is our response when the subject passes our last and final "Do Not Cross" line? How can we create consequences? Who is the best person to explain the "rules" to the subject? How can we help the victim(s) cope with the stress? TA INFORMATION SOURCES Personnel file review. Co-worker, friend, family, parent contact. Workers' comp-related medical or mental health records. E-mails, texts, letters, journals. Facebook, Twitter, blog posts. Auditing office computer or agency cell phone data. Information from co-workers, family, neighbors. Tarasoff warnings from clinicians. Information from law enforcement. INHIBITORS VS. IGNITORS Money Economic stress Job security Job loss Family presence Family crises Love relationships) Broken heart Friends / social Loner behavior connections Irrational religious beliefs Religious beliefs One-dimensional life Interests / hobbies Pain Rules and norms `Interference" INDICATORS OF HIGHER RISK Antisocial, Borderline, Paranoid, Narcissistic Psychotic, Schizophrenic, Bipolar Substance Abuse History Violent History, Suicide attempts 'Injustice Collector"/ Blaming Behavior Severe Depression Mullen's Big 3: drugs, violence history, depression Albrecht's Big 4: minimize, rationalize, deny, blame 40 GOALS OF TA INTERVIEWING It can send a signal to the subject that his / her behavior has been noticed. It can allow the subject to tell his / her story. It helps us gather information that can be verified, analyzed, or discounted. It can provide an opportunity to communicate to the subject that his or her behavior is unwelcome, unacceptable, and must stop. INTERVIEW WARNINGS An interview may intensify the subject's interest in the target or the risk of lethal behavior. Examples: Increased depression and suicidal ideations. Self-perceptions of abandonment, loss of hope. More security barriers in place to the target. Sense that time is running out. Perception of no other options except violence. BENEVOLENT SEVERANCE? - 's (a/k/a ��Lovely Parting Gifts") Post-employment letter. �� Uncontested unemployment insurance claim. Resigning in lieu of termination. Continuation of EAP and health benefits (beyond COBRA). Severance package. Outplacement services. Quick access to final paycheck, vacation pay, retirement accounts. Agreement on reference check calls. Single point of contact. DV IN THE WORKPLACE RESPONSES Victim's right to privacy, Suspect's behaviors, right to self-manage, boundary probing, right to a safe workplace security concerns, law violations When do we have the right to get involved in an employee's personal life? BUSINESS IMPACT DV CASE ISSUES Pros: Cons: The suspect is usually known. Except in stalking cases. We can bring many resources. We don't always talk collectively. There are more consequences Some suspects don't fear any for suspects. consequences. We can be more visible to Some victims don't want our help. victims. These cases can drag on for We can respond quickly. years. We can help rescue the victim We are perceived as the from a potential tragedy. "harassers." 45 STALKER TYPOLOGIES 46 23 Common or Simple Obsessional Love Obsessional Erotomaniac Source: Drs. Zona, Meloy, Lt. J. Lane THE �SAFE ROOM" RESPONSE: Knowing �the Outs" Figure Out Whe ghtning Strikes - Get Out - Spread Out Take Out Post-incident counseling THE ��ACTIVE SHOOTER OR ARMED ATTACKER" RESPONSE Knowing the Outs: Where? 47 UIQ H��E � FIG�I� Burt (Get out, Evacuate) SUFtYiVJNG AN ACME SHOOTER O - Hide (Lock Out, Barricade) _ - Keep Out 48 24 �'_�_ Spread Out - '• Fight (Take Out, Protect) � ,� � Cover vs. Concealment? `� _ A 15-minute Drill IMPORTANT QUESTIONS . . . How do we manage staff concerns and fears about these issues? What is our mass notification plan? How will we evacuate or shelter the disabled employees or taxpayers? Have we discussed the intensity of the police response and its likely variations? Will we have the ability or desire to schedule a yearly Run-Hide drill with our staff? What mental health resources can we provide immediately after an event and going forward? PHYSICAL SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS Access control solutions. Door hardware and panic alarms. Lockdown procedures that can be initiated by all staff. Cameras, especially for blind spots. Better fencing and gates. Better building and rooftop signage. Improved PA systems and notification software. ' Red I _.... - building plans, maps, rosters. Knox Boxes - facility instructions, utility shutoffs. FUTURE CHALLENGES Copycat factor? Dangerous Aprils? The balance between dollars and security? The violence-obsessed media culture? Employee entitlements about behavior? Cross-over problems come from home to work? THE LAST VIOLENCE EQUATION Motive + Opportunity = threat Potentia. We won't always know the motive nor be able to change it. 51 Attacks are usually preceded by survei/lance and p/arming. Bad people are deterred by courageous people, good security, constant awareness, sharing information, and 52 26 reporting and acting on behaviors of concern, third-party leakage, and suspicious indicators Awareness / Vigilance / Access Control / Policies / Consistency / Notification / Partnerships